Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 1

10-1-1980

Managerial Restructuring: Prospects for a New
Regulatory Tool
Lewis D. Solomon
Nancy Stein Nowak

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lewis D. Solomon & Nancy S. Nowak, Managerial Restructuring: Prospects for a New Regulatory Tool, 56 Notre Dame L. Rev. 120
(1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 4

Managerial Restructuring:
Prospects For A New Regulatory Tool
Lewis D. Solomon*
and
Nancy Stein Nowak**

I. Introduction
In his book Where the Law Ends, Professor Christopher D. Stone
characterizes what he labels as the continuing "corporate problem" as a
"legacy of the law's failure to search out and take into account the unique
features of business corporations as actors .

. . ."I

Traditional sanctions in

response to corporate wrongdoing, he suggests, rely on legal theories of deterrence which envision the corporation as an individual. 2 Legal responsibility for
a corporation's misbehavior could be traced to particular persons while the corporation as a legal entity was still in its formative stages. However, the large,
modern corporate entity is too complex for such treatment. 3 Although corporations consist of individuals, organizational forces tend to weaken individual
identity. "In this setting each man's own wants, ideas-even his perceptions
and emotions-are swayed and directed by an institutional structure . .. .,4
Legal sanctions that are based upon theories of individual motivation,
5
therefore, are inappropriate tools for dealing with corporate behavior.
Traditional strategies for controlling corporate activity are divisible into
two categories. 6 One is built upon the assumption that corporations respond
like individuals to dollar penalties or "negative profits." 7 According to Stone,
however, neither criminal fines nor civil judgments against the corporate entity
have proven effective in changing corporate practices and attitudes. 8 Stone
suggests several reasons for this failure. First, legislatures are unwilling to provide appropriately large penalties for corporate criminal activities for fear of
losing revenue and employment opportunities to more permissive
jurisdictions. 9 Second, courts rarely impose damage awards which are substantial enough to deter unlawful actions. 10 Third, even comparatively "stiff' fines
represent minor expenses to the corporation. Insurance can effectively shield
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University, National Law Center; B.A., 1963, Cornell
University; J.D., 1966, Yale Law School.
. * B.A., 1975, M.A., 1977, Drake University; J.D., 1980, The George Washington University, National Law Center.
I C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 1 (1975).
2 Id. at 8-10.
3 Id. at 93-110.
4 Id. at7.
5 Id. at 93-110.
6 Id. at 29.
7 Id. at 35-57.

8
9
10

Id.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 40-46.
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the corporation from actual financial responsibility.1 1 Product "mistakes" pose
a risk of much greater losses. 1 2 Finally, any stigma imposed by penalties assessed against a corporation is shared by the entire organization, thereby diffusing individual responsibility. 13 Individuals actually responsible for corand consequently have no incentive to halt or
porate wrongdoing avoid blame
4
modify undesirable activity."
The second strategy used to control corporate behavior focuses on the
dominant individuals in the organization, threatening them with personal
financial liability or imprisonment for illegal corporate actions.1 5 According to
Stone, this strategy is also ineffective, since penalties are invoked against corporate officials only in unusual circumstances. 16 The requirement that a particular corporate official have actual knowledge of the wrongdoing is a barrier
both to the imposition of liability for corporate wrongdoing and to the transfer
of information within a corporation. 17 In the rare instances in which fines are
actually imposed, the responsible official often is immune from personal financial liability because of either insurance or indemnification arrangements with
the corporation. 8 Lastly, Stone observes, no stigma attaches to the conviction
of a corporate official. The ambiguity and inconsistent enforcement of laws
aimed at corporate activity present no threat of shame and perform no deterrent function. Convicted individuals quite often return to the same position of
responsibility and have little incentive to modify their behavior.1 9
Stone notes that these traditional strategies share other characteristics
which contribute to their ineffectiveness. They are retrospective-functioning
after the undesirable activity and injury have occurred-and intrusive-imposing upon the corporation from outside but leaving basic corporate structures
and attitudes unchanged. They also are often counterproductive. Convicted officials and corporations adjudged liable may believe that the law is inconsistently applied. Instead of encouraging obedience to the law, the appearance
of arbitrary enforcement fosters resentment and the channeling of energies into
resourceful avoidance of legal responsibility for future conduct.
The inadequacy of traditional legal strategies has been underscored by the
increasingly dominant role played by the corporation in American society. As
corporations have grown in number, their political power has grown in
sophistication. Their activities, consequently, have widespread ramifications
and the social costs of those activities, unchecked by the outdated legal theories
of corporate behavior, have multiplied.
In response to this bleak analysis of present deterrence theories, Professor
Stone recommends that legal approaches be revamped and that upon a finding
of corporate wrongdoing, forthright intrusions into the corporation structure
be made. This restructuring involves, most importantly, the creation of an
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

40.
46-50.
58-69.
60-61.
64-66.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October 19801

"institutional analogue to the role that responsibility plays in human
beings." 20 Stone suggests that this will result in the prevention of wrongdoing,
not through after-the-fact punishment but through the development of a "corporate consciousness."" Specifically, he recommends that management functions be reassigned and that internal informational channels be improved so as
to assure that information is transferred upward to those key individuals whose
responsibilities include the receipt of information. Combining these two
measures, Stone suggests, will result in the introduction of a sense of social
responsibility into the decision making process of the corporation.
Several cease and desist orders entered by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have reflected this approach. The orders include provisions mandating
"nternal corporate restructuring in order to forestall future violations of
the
iaw. The Commission's authority for these orders is based on section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 22 which has been interpreted to
give the agency a broad range of discretion when addressing unfair and deceptive trade practices. 23 Even orders which proscribe activities other than the
specifically enumerated statutory violations have been upheld as long as findings and supporting analysis are presented and the orders themselves are
24
reasonably specific.
The FTC has employed managerial remedies in response to violations of
section 5 occurring in four different types of businesses. In addition to addressing the immediate problems caused by past deceptive advertising practices, the
FTC orders have required the establishment of improved systems of information handling, the creation of separate management level positions with
responsibility for receiving and transferring customer feedback, and the assignment of important duties to specific individuals in the corporate organization.
Had the orders been fully complied with, either visible improvements
within the corporations would have resulted or Professor Stone's proposals
would have been proven as ineffective as the traditional approaches he
criticizes. However, examination of the compliance with and the effects of
these orders reveals uneven results. After the variables that undoubtedly
skewed the ultimate effect of the orders have been discounted, it appears that
although the results have been less than dramatic, the remedial schemes have
been both responsive to the industry or corporate problems and effective in injecting a sense of "consciousness" into the organizations. This article discusses
the orders, the intervening variables, and the orders' effects as indicators of the
validity of Professor Stone's theories. The experience of the FTC in four
groups of consent orders is examined: the basement waterproofing industry, an
aircraft company, the foamed plastics industry, and the mobile home industry.
20 Id. at 120.
21 Id. at 217-27.
22 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1976).
23 Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
24 FTC v. Anheuser Busch, 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
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II. The Consent Orders
Case 1: Basement Waterproofing Companies
Three consent orders involving basement waterproofing companies contained managerial remedies which attempted to improve the flow of information within the corporate organization and direct information coming from outside the corporation to responsible management officials. The effects of these
orders demonstrate both the inherent weaknesses of such attempts and their
potential for changing corporate behavior.
The FTC issued the first of the three consent orders in July 1976.25 Northerlin Company, Inc. of Flushing, New York (Northerlin), respondent to the
order, operated under the name "Vulcan Basement Waterproofing" and had
subsidiary operations in nine states. The FTC's complaint cited numerous
misrepresentations and deceptive statements in Northerlin's advertising and
sales program, concerning the performance and price of its products, the existence of service guarantees, and the size of its business facilities. 26 Noting that
Northerlin's deceptive practices induced consumers to make payments and
assume obligations which they would not have otherwise incurred, the Commission issued a comprehensive order designed to eliminate the specific violations and, further, to attack more pervasive ills in the corporation's managerial
27
structure and information processing system.
To eliminate the particular instances of wrongdoing, the FTC ordered
Northerlin, its subsidiaries, successors and assigns, officers, and employees to
"cease and desist" from misrepresenting its products or services. 28 Specifically, Northerlin was enjoined from characterizing its process as exclusive, permanent, or completely effective in all basements, and from misrepresenting the
ease and convenience with which it could perform its services. 29 Affirmatively,
the Commission required Northerlin to disclose in all advertisements and sales
materials the limited effectiveness of one of its two methods of waterproofing,
and to advise the public that tests by qualified engineers were necessary to certify the effectiveness of this particular service. 3 0 The FTC also required
respondents to clarify certain vague or inappropriate language in its promotional materials. The word "guarantee" could be used only when a full and
complete guarantee was offered, and conditional guarantees were to be explicitly distinguished. In addition, to prevent misrepresentations of the size of
the corporate business, the word "office" could only be used if the respondent
had a fully staffed office in a particular community.3 1
The Commission also ordered Northerlin to provide customers with a
three-day cooling-off period even though such a provision was -unrelated to the
specifically alleged violations of the FTC Act. When contracting for products
or services, customers were to be afforded notice and an opportunity to cancel
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

In re Northerlin Co., 88 F.T.C. 38 (1976).
Id. at 40-46.
Id. at 46-51.
Id. at 46-49.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48-49.
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any obligation within three days of their signing. If they so canceled, they were
to receive a full refund within three days. Northerlin had the duty not only to
provide notice of this right, but also to furnish the forms necessary to effectuate
32
the termination.
To ensure Northerlin's compliance with the order, the Commission imposed a duty on the corporation to inform all employees of the details of the
agreement, obtain their consent to be bound by its terms, and dismiss all who
refused to comply. 33 Furthermore, the agency mandated the establishment of
both a system of surveillance (to ensure future companywide compliance) and a
recordkeeping system (for Commission review and verification of
compliance). 34 To discourage future violations, the FTC ordered respondents
to notify it thirty days prior to any proposed dissolution, assignment or sale of
the corporation affecting its compliance obligations. In addition, the
respondents were to provide a compliance report for the Commission's review
within sixty days of service of the order.3 5 Finally, the Commission ordered
Northerlin to establish a "customer relations" department to ensure that contractual obligations were fulfilled and to improve the flow of information within
the corporation. 36 Northerlin was ordered to give customers the location and
telephone number of this department, to respond to complaints within seven
days, and to maintain for Commission inspection records of customer requests
and services rendered.
The consent order failed to have a significant effect on Northerlin. The
company did not file the required sixty-day compliance report and a subsequent FTC investigation revealed that another waterproofing company,
Vulcan Basement Waterproofing of Flushing, Inc. (Vulcan), had purchased
Northerlin's equipment and office furniture and had occupied its former
37
business offices.
Although the president of Vulcan denied that his company was required to
comply with the FTC cease and desist order, 3a his correspondence with the
FTC, as well as reports prepared by various consumer agencies, suggest that
Vulcan is obeying the spirit if not the letter of the consent order.3 9 Copies of
customer service requests submitted to the Commission by Vulcan show the
32 Id. at 49-50.
33 Id. at 50-51.
34 Id. at 51.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 47.
37 Compliance File for FTC Investigation of Northerlin Co. The compliance file contains information
from a series of interview reports and other documents. All compliance files referred to below are located in
the Washington, D.C. central office of the FTC.
38 Id. The three consent orders directed at waterproofers were made binding on "successors and
assigns" of the targeted companies. In re Everseal Waterproofing Corp., 89 F.T.C. 110, 125 (1977); In re
National Meridian Services, 89 F.T.C. 192, 207 (1977); In re Northerlin, 88 F.T.C. 38, 51 (1976).
39 Vulcan has responded to service requests of former Northerlin customers while denying any legal
obligation to do so. Compliance File, supra note 37.
New York Better Business Bureau files showed a satisfactory record of prompt consideration of consumer complaints, including providing additional treatment, extending the warranty service period, and offering refunds. Id. Furthermore, the FTC's Boston Regional Office has not received a significant number of
complaints regarding Vulcan's work. According to Mr. William F. Connolly of that office, Vulcan and
Everseal, the subject of another cease and desist order, have simply changed the way they do business. That
change is due, not so much to literal compliance with the consent order or the creation of a customer relations department but to the discontinuance of the pressure pumping method of waterproofing and a change
in advertising methods. Telephone Interview with William F. Connolly, Staff Attorney, FTC's Boston
Regional Office (Nov. 26, 1979).
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seven-day response required of Northerlin; the Vulcan contract contains the
required three-day cancellation option; and Vulcan no longer offers the
pressure pumping waterproofing method which was the subject of special
disclosure requirements in the consent order.
Although Vulcan established neither the special customer service department nor the employee surveillance system which the Commission required of
Northerlin, the new company is reportedly a "responsible" operation. 40 Its
owners have found that the questioned practices and ineffective services
resulted in no savings to the corporation. Although the new company has not
established the customer complaint department required in the consent order,
it nevertheless has promptly attended to service requests. 41 Accordingly, it appears that at least a measure of corporate restructuring and subsequent consumer benefit has been brought about.
A similar assessment may be made regarding the effectiveness of a second
consent order issued in February 1977 against Everseal Waterproofing Company (Everseal), a comparatively small basement waterproofing business
operating in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. 42 The FTC's complaint alleged violations of the FTC Act by Everseal in all three states. It varied
from the Northerlin order in naming, in addition to the corporate respondents,
a present and a former officer who were allegedly responsible for the deceptive
practices of the company. 43 Beyond this distinction, the complaint and order
44
contained provisions similar to those included in the Northerlin case.
The consent order in Everseal was about as effective as the consent order
in Northerlin in changing corporate behavior. By the time Everseal filed its required compliance report in January 1978, only one of the three corporate
defendants remained in existence. 45 In addition, one of the two individual
respondents had terminated all connection with Everseal in February 1976.46
Mr. William Epner, the other individual respondent and author of the compliance statement, reported that as sole representative of Everseal he had informed all customers that he alone was responsible for all sales and services,
and had given them his own telephone number in case additional service
became necessary. 47 Only nine of 107 contracts were revoked in 1977 as a
result of the three-day cancellation option, and all nine custorers received full
refunds. 48 Misleading claims regarding Everseal's waterproofing services
ceased, and the company virtually eliminated its advertising campaign.
Customers were provided a five-year guarantee that Everseal would eliminate
continuing seepage problems without charge. Mr. Epner also reported that all
49
twenty customer service requests were satisfactorily answered.
As in Northerlin, perhaps the most dramatic change effected by the
Everseal consent order was the de-emphasis of the pressure pumping method of
40 Compliance File, supra note 37.
41 Id.
42 In re Everseal Waterproofing Corp., 89 F.T.C. 110 (1979).
43 Id. at 111.
44 88 F.T.C. at 39.
45 Compliance File for FTC Investigation of Everseal Waterproofing Corp.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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waterproofing, previously the primary company service. As Mr. Epner noted
in his report, "We have changed our operations considerably [and] .. .are
now concentrating on doing floor (pressure relief) systems." ' 50 No doubt the
cost of compliance-especially the disclosure and guarantee provisions-rendered pressure pumping an unprofitable company service.5 1
An FTC staff attorney responded to Everseal's compliance report in
February 1978, noting certain minor deficiencies which required further attention. He noted that the company's yellow-page advertisement did not disclose
that one of the two types of waterproofing services might not prevent leaks, and
that the advertisement mentioned a "guarantee" without disclosing its conditions and exemptions. 52 The staff attorney also complained that Everseal's contract form and yellow-page ads falsely implied that certain listed cities had fully
staffed offices. He requested that contracts list only the Newton, Massachusetts
home office, and that the company limit its yellow-page advertising to the
Boston metropolitan area directories. Going to the heart of the consent order,
the FTC attorney noted that the compliance report made no mention of a
customer relations department and that the Commission had not been supplied
with copies of customer verifications of satisfactory responses to service requests. 53 Everseal's president acknowledged these omissions by letter on
March 28 and agreed to rectify the noncompliance. The FTC then accepted
the compliance report in May 1978, and indicated that no action would commence against the respondents so long as they continued the promised com54
pliance.
It appears that the FTC order was responsible for effecting some change in
the way Everseal did business. By creating duties of disclosure beyond those
otherwise imposed by law, and by threatening Everseal's president with individual liability for corporate wrongdoing, the FTC forced the company to
abandon its most misleading promotional practices and most questionable
waterproofing services. Although fundamental managerial restructuring was
not achieved nor formal information handling systems established, Everseal
was required to accept responsibility for its business conduct. Responding to
complaints in a timely and satisfactory manner in turn brought the ineffectiveness of certain waterproofing methods to the company's attention. The lack
of total compliance with the consent order's provisions did not obviate the
order's success in bringing about significant, if not the intended, corporate
restructuring.
In contrast to the orders employed in the Northerlin and Everseal cases,
the third consent order was unsuccessful. That order involved Meridian Waterproofing Corporation (Meridian), a $10-million-a-year company. Meridian operated waterproofing and termite control businesses from its principal of-

50 Id.
51 Telephone Interview with Connolly, supra note 39.
52 Compliance File, supra note 45.
53 Id.
54 Id. The Boston Regional Office reports that it has not received the number or kinds of complaints
regarding the business practices of Everseal that it had received previously. With a decline in customer complaints and a change in the company's method of waterproofing, the FTC will not attempt to enforce the
consent order to the letter. Id.
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fice in Mineola, New York.55 In March 1975, the FTC issued a complaint
against Meridian, its parent corporation, National Meridian Services (National Meridian), and two officers and directors of Meridian, Michael Pascucci
and Austin Royle. 56 The Commission alleged violations of section 5 of the FTC
Act similar to those alleged in the Everseal and Northerlin cases. 5 7 In addition,
the complaint alleged that Meridian had misrepresented the education, training and experience of its employees; exaggerated the risk and immediacy of
danger to potential customers from water and termite damage; failed to
disclose to customers that financial obligations might be assigned to finance
companies; and falsely claimed that such recognized publications as Better
Homes and Gardens and The New York Times had endorsed its services. 58
In response to these violations, the Commission ordered the respondents
to cease and desist making misrepresentations about (1) the size of the company, (2) the qualifications of its staff, (3) the uniqueness and permanence of its
products and services, (4) the nature of guarantees and warranties offered, (5)
the existence of special prices without reference to the dollar or percentage savings, and (6) the existence of endorsements by reputable publications.5 9 The
FTC also ordered respondents to cease the use of scare tactics to induce purchases, to disclose the assignment of financial obligations to third parties, and
to make all other disclosures required by federal law. The Commission further
directed respondents to inform customers of the three-day cooling off period
60
during which they could cancel their obligations without penalty.
To effectuate and monitor compliance, the Commission directed Meridian to:
(1) disclose in all advertising that it did not always provide prompt service,
unless it established an address and phone number for submitting service
requests
and complaints and responded to those requests within seven
61
days;
(2) create a recordkeeping system documenting the claimed performance
characteristics of respondents' products and services,
and the nature of
62
consumer complaints and company responses;
(3) notify all employees of the order and of their obligation to comply with its
terms;
(4) design a system of surveillance to monitor compliance and employee
violations; and
(5) report to the FTC changes in the corporation which might affect com55 In 1975, corporate revenues totalled $9,800,000 and assets were estimated at $3,700,000. National

Meridian maintained offices in 19 cities with 1,000 employees and 100 salesmen. Compliance File for FTC
Investigation of National Meridian Services, Inc.
The Wall StreetJournal, on October 1, 1976, reported a net income for the company in fiscal 1976 at
$314,915. Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1976, at 21, col. 2. On October 4, 1977 the same publication reported that
figure had dropped to a net loss of $735,863. Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1977, at 37, col. 2.
56 In re National Meridian Services, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 192 (1977). Michael Pascucci was president and a
director of National Meridian as well as principal shareholder and responsible for advertising. Austin Royle
was vice-president and a director of National Meridian, an officer of Meridian, and in charge of personnel
training. Compliance File, supra note 55.
57 89 F.T.C. at 198-99.
58 Id. at 193-99.
59 89 F.T.C. at 200-05.
60 Id. at 203-04.
61 Id. at 200-01.
62 Id. at 201.
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pliance obligations, and 63changes in the affiliation or responsibilities of the
individual respondents.
Like the respondents in Northerlin and Everseal, Meridian avoided full
compliance with the consent order obligations. Meridian filed its compliance
report in June 1977 as required by the consent order. In August, before
correcting the deficiencies, National Meridian advised the FTC of its intention
64
to sell its waterproofing and termite control businesses to Ruthra Services.
The sale took place one month later, and was intended to represent the "complete disposition" of the corporate and individual respondents' involvement in
65
waterproofing and termite control services.
Following this sale, National Meridian changed its name to Trexar Corporation and became involved in "the origination of property modernization
loans for various lenders," with respondent Pascucci president and director of
the company.6 6 Respondent Royle left National Meridian and became vicepresident of a "light construction business," Spruce Management Services
67
(Spruce), with duties as financial consultant and construction manager.
Although Spruce may have provided some waterproofing and termite control
services, the corporation prohibited Royle from participating in those activities. 68 In April 1978, Royle left Spruce after the company's financial condi69
tion worsened.
Meanwhile, Ruthra Services, which had agreed to be bound by the consent order in its purchase agreement with National Meridian, filed for
bankruptcy in February 1978.70 With Pascucci and Royle out of the waterproofing business and the successor company in receivership, the FTC formally announced in June 1979 its determination that no further compliance action
was warranted, reserving the right to renew investigation if circumstances war7
ranted. 1
The history of noncompliance in the Meridian case illustrates the effectiveness of "structural remedies." Although it fails to reinforce Professor
Stone's theories unequivocally, Meridian's history demonstrates that a corporation engaging in deceptive business practices, including misrepresentation
of product performance and purposeful ignorance of product or service quality,
may be forced into dissolution by regulatory intervention.
The compliance histories in all three of the waterproofing cases indicate
that the FTC's consent orders effectuated some modifications in corporate
behavior. However, these modifications may have been stimulated by other
factors. The present widespread industry acceptance of the three-day cooling

63 Id. at 205-06.
64 Letter from Jack Lipson (Counsel for National Meridian, now Trexar Corp.) to William S. Sanger
(Staff Attorney, FTC's Washington Regional Office) (Mar. 8, 1978).
65 Id.
66 Letter from Stephen M. Sacks (Counsel for National Meridian, now Trexar Corp.) to Lester G.
Grey (Staff Attorney, FTC's New York Regional Office) (Oct. 13, 1978).
67 Letter from Jack Lipson (Counsel for National Meridian, now Trexar Corp.) to Lester G. Grey
(Staff Attorney, FTC's New York Regional Office) (Oct. 13, 1978).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Compliance File, supra note 55.
71 Id.
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off period, for example, should be traced not to these consent orders but to state
statutes and the FTC's regulation of door-to-door sales. 72 Moreover, the consent orders alone cannot account for the industry's abandonment of the
pressure pumping method of waterproofing, since this technique had never
been offered by other than very large or fraudulent companies. Industrywide
changes have also altered business practices. Firms engaged in basement
waterproofing no longer make outlandish product claims, a change which
parallels a shift in ownership of these firms. 73 As the industry has become more
competitive, companies have been forced to respond to service requests and to
drop unsuccessful waterproofing techniques in order to survive. Thus, the impact of these three consent orders on corporate behavior must be evaluated in
light of the total context in which the changes in corporate behavior occurred.
Case 2: Bede Aircraft
The FTC used managerial remedies to a greater extent in response to an
unusual situation involving Bede Aircraft, Inc. (Bede). 74 Unfortunately, the
remedial scheme was not put to a fair test because of the corporation's
precarious financial position and the FTC's delays in effectuating the required
corporate restructuring.
Bede was a Kansas manufacturer of sport aircraft which advertised and
accepted orders for both factory and "do-it-yourself' kit-built versions of one,
two and four seat airplanes. 75 The price of the airplanes started at $1800 in
1971 and ranged from $3600 to $4000 in 1978.76 The planes, which could be
easily disassembled and loaded into trailers for transport and storage, were
72 Telephone Interview with James Dyson, Chief Investigator of the Home Improvement Industry Section, Montgomery County Consumer Affairs Office (Nov. 3, 1978).
73 Telephone Interview with Connolly, supra note 39.
Attempting to gauge the "effectiveness" of these orders, several strategies were pursued by this author.
The results are inconclusive.
Comparisons of consumer reaction to Washington area waterproofing companies failed to establish any
industry response to the orders. Numbers of complaints in waterproofing are consistent, agreed Dyson,
Cynthia Levy of The Washington Post Real Estate News Section, and Carrie Ellis of the Better Business
Bureau, due to the nature of the business (service oriented) and the type of soil in the region. Telephone Interview with Dyson, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Cynthia Levy (Nov. 3, 1978); Telephone Interviews with Carrie Ellis (Nov. 3 and Nov. 6, 1978). Ms. Ellis also noted that all 22 complaints received by
her office in 1977 involving waterproofing companies were of a routine nature, none involving advertising or
sales practices of the businesses.
Other industry observers believe FTC activities were ineffective. As discussed above, Dyson of the
Montgomery County Consumer Affairs Office explained that inherent industry features were responsible.
Les Blattner of the National Association of Home Builders' Consumer Affairs Office agreed with the assessment of ineffectiveness and characterized the consent order as a particularly ineffective tool for bringing
about industrywide change. Telephone Interview with- Dyson, supra note 72. Hugh Barndollar, former
Vulcan employee, said the orders were ineffective but put blame on public ignorance of FTC rulings, the
failure of area consumer agencies in educating consumers, and widespread public acceptance of the inevitability of "getting taken," especially by service industries such as waterproofing. Telephone Interview
Hugh Barndollar, Owner of Accredited Waterproofing (Nov. 6, 1978). Taking the other position, Michael
Mpras felt that the consent orders were somewhat effective, pointing to evidence that the targeted companies have had to make drastic changes in the way they do business. Telephone Interview with Michael
Mpras, Staff Attorney, FTC's Washington Regional Office (Nov. 2, 1978).
74 Also joined as respondents were Bede Wing and Bede General Corporation, merely "paper corporations" according to Kenneth Bennington, formerly with the FTC and responsible for negotiating the consent order on behalf of the Commission. Telephone interview with Kenneth Bennington, Staff Attorney,
FTC's Denver Regional Office (Dec. 3, 1979).
75 In re Bede Aircraft, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 449 (1978).
76 Marsh, FTC Moves to Assist Bede Customers, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 19, 1978, at 32.
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reputed to be "good product[s]"' 7 7 and were highly attractive to consumers
78
because of their unusual design and low cost.
However attractive the products, the company suffered from "lousy
management." 79 Bede solicited orders and collected deposits, representing that
its products were available for delivery. In fact, the company used the deposits
to fund research and development.8 0 The firm actually delivered few aircraft.
By the summer of 1978, Bede had received deposits totalling $6.3 million and
accumulated about 9500 unfilled orders. 8 '
Meanwhile, consumer complaints to the FTC regarding Bede's delayed
and incomplete shipments of ordered products were more numerous than any
other in Commission history. 82 In response to these complaints, the FTC
began an investigation into Bede's business practices. 8 3 Although complaints
began pouring into the Kansas City regional office in 1974, the closing of that
office stalled the FTC's inquiry, as did the Commission's belief that Bede
might cure its financial and management woes on its own. Bede had come
"tantalizingly close" to being able to pull itself out of trouble on several occasions, a solution which the Commission much preferred.8 4 The Commission
was also mindful of the continued desire of the great majority of customers for
the product as ordered and not for a mere refund of their deposits. By
mid-1978, however, it appeared that without Commission intervention Bede
would collapse and consumers would be left without recourse. The situation
demanded that the FTC act boldly.
To this end, the FTC filed a complaint against Bede which revealed the
pervasive nature of the corporation's deceptive practices. 85 The complaint
alleged that Bede had violated section 5 of the FTC Act by misrepresenting
that: (1) aircraft kits were available for sale and ready to ship; (2) complete
delivery of the kits could be accomplished in logical sequence and at reasonable
intervals; (3) the planes could be easily assembled in 800 hours using simple
hand tools; and (4) engines and drive system subassemblies were available with
the kits. 86 The Commission also alleged that Bede had circulated misleading
financial statements, failed to issue refunds when requested, neglected to
remedy its precarious financial condition, and used advance payments for
87
research and product development without disclosing such use to customers.
77 FTC Setiles Case that Involves Kitsfor Building Planes, Wall St. J., June 13, 1978, at 14, col. 4 (quoting
M. Pertschuk, FTC Chairman).
The United States Air Force reportedly considered purchasing several BD-5J's, the jet-powered version of the single seat BD-5, in 1975. At that time the assembled craft, for which there was a backlog of sixty
orders, cost $29,000; the kit version cost $24,000. USAF Views BD-5J as Transition Trainer, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 3, 1975, at 40 (1975).

78 In addition to its disassembly feature, the BD-5 sported a unique rear propeller. Telephone Interview with Lt. Joseph Wallace, Public Works Officer, United States Navy (Dec. 2, 1979).
79 FTC Settles Case that Involves Kits for Building Planes, supra note 77.
80 Factory built models which were shipped had not yet received the required FAA certification.
Marsh, supra note 76.
81 Id.
82 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Bennington, Assistant Regional Director, FTC's Denver
Regional Office (Dec. 3, 1979).
83 Id. Public response to the consent order also generated record-setting interest. Over 100 public comments were received by the Commission-an unprecedented number.
84 Id.
85 92 F.T.C. at 450-59 (1978).
86 Id. at 454-55.
87 Id. at 457-59.
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InJune 1978, Bede and its sole shareholder, James R. Bede, signed a consent order which the FTC accepted after an unusual and unfortunate four
month delay. 88 The order required, first, that the respondents cease and desist
from the misrepresentations and unfair practices enumerated above.8 9 Second,
it established a system of priorities among consumer creditors according to the
kind of airplane each had ordered and what method of reimbursement each
had selected.90 Third, the order required respondents to enter into an escrow
agreement with a financial institution which would act in a fiduciary capacity,
holding and disbursing corporate assets in a manner consistent with the consent agreement. 9 1 Finally, the order provided for the appointment of an independent, third-party trustee to control Bede's stock and to oversee the company's operations. 92 The trustee was empowered to remove and replace directors who appeared to be acting in violation of the consent order and, if "no
other reasonable alternative exists for the successful operation of the company
93
consistent with the spirit" of the order, to initiate bankruptcy proceedings.
The trustee was also responsible for the appointment of "authorized officials"
who would in turn be responsible for operations at each of the respondent's
94
business sites.
Although the FTC exercised its full authority in drafting the Bede order,
events beyond the Commission's control assumed primary significance by the
time the order was finally accepted.9 5 Because Bede was in a precarious financial position by the fall of 1978, the success of the consent decree and the trustee
arrangement depended on the company's ability to stall its creditors and obtain
working capital. A loan agreement was negotiated with a Virginia bank which
would have been used to build a new production facility in Virginia. The loan,
however, was conditioned on Bede's obtaining a loan guarantee from the
Farmers' Home Administration.9 6 Although the possibility of obtaining the
guarantee seemed promising when the Commission accepted the consent
order, the Farmers' Home Administration eventually refused to extend the
guarantee as hoped.
In addition to this setback, business creditors secured judgments against
Bede prior to the Commission's acceptance of the consent agreement.9 7 Execu88 92 F.T.C. at 449. The Commissioners did not react with unanimous or immediate approval toward
the Bede consent order in the summer of 1978. The question of its appropriateness from a policy standpoint
was not resolved until October of that year. However, after its acceptance, it was publicly endorsed by even
the vigorous Commission opponents. Telephone Interview with Bennington, supra note 74.
89 Id. at 462-63.
90 Id. at 469-75. Those options included: rescission of the purchase contract and refund of advance payment or deposit plus interest; rescission and refund on all uncompleted kits returned to respondent; reaffirmance of the order at the price paid by dealers 90 days prior to the date such customer paid the purchase
price in full; or, if the purchase price had been paid in full, reaffirmance plus interest to be paid by Bede on
that amount.
91 Id. at 466-69.
92 Id. at 462.
93 Id. at 485-86.
94 Id. at 479-80.
95 Telephone Interview with Bennington, supra note 74. Bennington suggested that "politics finally
killed" the loan, noting the "strange timing" of that decision. He also explained that many people disliked
James Bede's flamboyant style and technological ingenuity and that his aircraft posed a significant threat to
established competitors.
96 FTC Settles Case that Involves Kitsfor Building Planes, supra note 77; Marsh, supra note 76.
97 Telephone Interview with Tom Lyons, Staff Attorney, FTC's Denver Regional Office (Nov. 26,
1979).
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tion of those judgments was temporarily stayed in August 1978 by the filing of
a Chapter X bankruptcy petition by Mr. Bede. However, a Chapter XI petition was filed after the withdrawal of the Chapter X petition. By the summer of
1979, Bede's few remaining assets were sold and distributed among its business
creditors.98
The Commission selected a trustee shortly after its formal acceptance of
the consent order in late 1978. Despite the sweeping powers given the trustee,
the momentum of the events described above proved irreversible. The overlapping jurisdictions of the bankruptcy court and the Commission posed one problem. In addition, the FTC had designed the order to forestall insolvency,
primarily through the prudent management of the corporation's assets by the
trustee and the escrow agent. However, bankruptcy occurred too quickly after
the appointment of the trustee for him to have an opportunity to exercise his
powers. 99 As of the fall of 1980, the 9500 customers had not received either kits
or refunds, and the Commission remained "very skeptical" that they ever
would. 100
The managerial remedies contained in Bede's consent order differ little in
theory from those found in the waterproofing company orders. The order
restructured the company's mode of doing business by providing for the appointment of outsiders-primarily a trustee-to oversee compliance, coordinate permanent restructuring, and institute changes in the day-to-day operations of the corporation. The trustee, along with the escrow agent, would have
ensured that Bede's business activities would comport with the interests of its
creditors and customers, and would have sought to place Bede's future operations on a secure footing.
The Commission was mindful that although Bede suffered from pervasive
managerial problems, it also offered an attractive product and possessed the
technological capabilities to have produced it as promised. The Commission
tailored its order to address these specific inadequacies and strengths.
However, the corporation's financial woes had progressed to such a point that
a fair test of the order and its theoretical basis was precluded. Furthermore,
without the loan guarantee the restructuring had no hope of success. 10 The
consent decree's failure to provide the desired consumer redress and corporate
revitalization merely underscores the importance of timing in the success of administrative intervention.
Case 3: Foamed Plastics Industry
Events beyond the control of a regulatory agency may also serve to
enhance the effect of managerial remedies. Such was the case in a consent
98

Id.

99 Id.
100 Id. Mr. Bennington cautioned that something could still come out of the consent order. Although
there are no definite possibilities that a loan could yet be negotiated or the bankruptcy court could force execution of the outstanding judgment liens, "drain Mr. Bede of every penny" and creditors thenceforth
would stop suing him. Telephone Interview with Bennington, supra note 74.
101 The Commission's reluctance to exercise its authority to insert a third party into a private corporation delayed acceptance of the order. However, according to Bennington, there was nothing more that the
Commission could have done to save Bede and insure consumer redress: only the speed of the Commission's
intervention could have helped. Id.
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order in which the FTC sought to inject a greater sense of responsibility into
the foamed plastics industry.
The FTC's investigation of the plastics industry grew out of complaints
regarding inaccurate or deceptive descriptions by plastics manufacturers of the
flammability characteristics of cellular or foamed plastics.1 0 2 The investigation,
which was formally announced in 1972, culminated in November 1974 in a
complaint lodged against the Society of Plastics, a trade association, and
twenty-six individual manufacturers of cellular plastics.10 3 The complaint
alleged that respondents violated section 5 of the FTC Act by disseminating
results of flammability tests performed on various cellular plastic products
which misrepresented the fire hazards posed by those products. 1 04 Specification
sheets and promotional materials described products' responses to fire on the
basis of small-scale laboratory tests, and used such labels as "selfextinguishing," "non-burning," and "non-combustible" to describe the
products. 0 5 However, the tests did not accurately measure, nor the labels accurately describe, the dangers inherent in actual fire situations.. 0 6 Furthermore, the Commission charged that the lay persons interpreted these test
results in their ordinary descriptive sense, rather than in narrow technical
sense.1 0 7 The complaint also asserted that widespread consumer ignorance of
the actual risk of fire contributed to the danger of serious harm to person and
property presented by cellular plastics.10 8
On November 4, 1974, the FTC accepted a consent order requiring
respondents to cease and desist from using expressions such as
"non-burning,"
"self-extinguishing,"
or "non-combustible"
in the
marketing of products. 0 9 The firms were permitted to use numerical flame
spread rates, the most common measure of comparative inflammability for
building materials, only if they warned consumers that the rating was "not intended to reflect hazards presented by the material under actual fire conditions.""10 In addition, the FTC ordered the respondents to cure the lingering
effects of past deceptive advertising practices by notifying purchasers of the
products since 1968 of the serious fire hazards posed by the products. In-

102 Show and Gillette, Urethane:A Deadly and Pervasive Peril,L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, S 1, at 14, col. 2.
103 In re Society of Plastics Industry, 84 F.T.C. 1253 (1974). The 26 manufacturers and respondents
were: Allied Chemical, ARCO Polymers, BASF Wyandotte, Baychem, Cook Paint and Varnish, Dow
Chemical, E.I. duPont de Nemours, Flintkote, Foster Grant, General Tire and Rubber, W.R. Grace,
Hooker Chemical, Jefferson Chemical, Millmaster Onyx, Mine Safety Appliances, Monsanto, Olin,
Owens-Coming, Fiberglass, PPG Industries, Tenneco Chemicals, Union Carbide, United States Steel,
Uniroyal, Upjohn, and Witco Chemical. Id. at 1255-58.
104 Cellular or foamed plastics are defined in Appendix A of the consent order, Id. at 1277-78.
105 Id. at 1267.
106 But see Kline, The Facts Behind the "Conspiracy" in Flammability Test Terminology, MOD. PLASTICS, June,
1976, at 64-66, wherein the author, who had participated in the development and refinement of these tests,
quoted at length from test reports which warned that flame spread and burning rates were not the only indicators of the actual fire hazard posed.
107 84 F.T.C. at 1261.
108 Id. at 1262.
109 Id. at 1271.
110 Id. Using the American Society of Tests and Materials' Steiner tunnel test, a "25 flame spread"
rating was assigned to most cellular plastics. That score classified the material as "noncombustible" under a
number of building codes throughout the United States. Id. at 1262. While the test was a useful measure of
flammability for traditional building products, it did not accurately register the more unusual burning
characteristics of plastics. See Show and Gillette, supra note 102.
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dividual notices were to be supplemented by publication of similar disclosures
in selected periodicals."1 '
The order also established a research program with three specific objectives: (1) to determine the most effective manner for employing cellular plastics
and systems containing such products to minimize fire hazards in the final intended uses; (2) to develop guidelines for the safe and effective use of such
cellular plastics; and (3) to develop accurate tests and standards for measuring
the behavior of cellular plastics in various burning conditions. 1 2 The research
program was to be managed by the Product Research Committee, composed of
nine members of proven technical competence."t 3 Four members selected by
the companies were to represent the industry; the remaining five members
were to be selected by the FTC and could not represent any competing in4
dustry. The nine members were to share responsibilities and powers equally."
The FTC was authorized to designate one of the members to serve as chairperson." 5 The committee was to keep minutes of all meetings and make them
available to the FTC upon request. 1 6 In addition, it was to submit an annual
report summarizing its activities to the Commission and all the respondent
companies. " Funding of the $5 million program was to be provided chiefly by
the Society of Plastics, with the balance supplied by the corporate
respondents." 8 The Society of Plastics could be credited with up to $2.5 million
of program funds for money spent on independent research unless the Product
Research Committee had evaluated the expenditure and determined that the
research did not further the objectives of the research program." 9 The order
also directed companies to provide up to $25,000 per year of administrative
support.1 0
An examination of industry promotional material circulated after the FTC
order suggests that the respondents have conscientiously attempted to comply
with the order's requirements. 12i Clearly, the order has helped purge prohibited expressions from industry promotional material. '22 References to flame
spread ratings in industry advertisements are now accompanied by the re123
quired warnings which caution against their accuracy.
More significantly, the Product Research Committee has begun to carry
out its responsibilities under the consent order. Early in its history, the committee sponsored seminars designed to gauge the informational needs of the industry. It then focused its activities in the areas of fundamental research, small111

84 F.T.C. at 1271-72.
112 Id. at 1272.
113 Id. at 1272-73.
114 Id. at 1272-74.
115 Id. at 1272-73.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1273.
119 Id. at 1273-74.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1277. The consent order requires respondents to supply the FTC with copies of all advertising
materials relative to cellular plastics. These materials are available for review at the FTC's Washington office.
122 Compliance File for FTC Investigation of Society of Plastics Industry.
123 For a critical account of the "woefully" inadequate government regulation of the marketing and
usage of plastics, seeShow and Gillette, supra note 102, at 13, col. 4. This series of articles demonstrates the
scope of the inflammability problem.
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scale tests, large-scale tests, and toxicity of combustible products. 124 During its
first year, the committee sponsored eight meetings on various topics relevant to
the inflammability problems of industry products. The meetings included
discussions of the widely used ASTM E-84 tunnel (flame spread) test and the
1 25
toxicology of combustion products.
The committee's work has been carried out "primarily through a series of
contracts and grants to various research laboratories.' '126 In soliciting research
bids, the committee has emphasized its interest in research which develops fire
tests on a large and small scale, measures characteristics of individual products
in various fire situations, and synthesizes results into an overall estimate of the
hazard presented. 127 This is the kind of information the industry had carefully
128
avoided developing in the previous decades.
The Fourth Annual Report of the Product Research Committee shows
that the group has retained its focus and structure.1 29 The committee appears
to have continued its interest in developing reliable indicators of product flammability in actual fire situations-the intended purpose of the committee's
creation in 1974.130
Any assessment of the effectiveness of the consent order must take into account other circumstances affecting the plastics industry. First, the Society of
Plastics had begun its own research program shortly before it accepted the
FTC's consent decree.1 31 Second, other government agencies besides the FTC
have directed their attention to the industry in the intervening years. 132 Third,
building codes, which previously incorporated the problematic tunnel test as a
measure of combustibility, have been updated to assess more accurately the
dangers of plastics in the building construction industry. 33 Fourth, the insurance industry has refused to insure structures insulated with urethane,
thereby contributing to the widespread rejection of small-scale test results as
reliable indicators of flammability.1 34 Finally, private damage suits have
spawned damaging publicity and have resulted in large awards for personal
and property damage against manufacturers who misrepresented or failed to
warn of the fire hazards presented by cellular plastics.1 35 The combined
124 Products Research Comm., First Annual Report (January, 1976) at 1.
125 Id. at 1-2.
126 Id. at 7.
127 Id. at 7-8.
128 See Show and Gillette, supra note 102 at 13, col. 3.
129 Products Research Comm., Fourth Annual Report (May, 1979). Six of the eight members of the
Committee were still serving as of May, 1979.
130 Cf Testing PlasticsforFireBehavior: The Smoke is Beginningto ClearAway, MOD. PLAsTIcs, Mar., 1976, at
46 ("intense research" is going on into the behavior of plastics in real-fire situations).
131 An industry attorney reportedly addressed a gathering of plastics manufacturers, in 1974, and
warned of the "disastrous" results of government interference unless steps were quickly taken to remedy
critical problems in testing. Show and Gillette, supra note 102, at 14, col. 2.
The consent order provision which allows the crediting of expenditures for independent research in
subjects of interest to the committee anticipates and encourages this industry activity.
See Kline, supra note 56, at 66. That observer had been involved in pre-consent order fire testing of
plastics and praised the order as accelerating the progress of various public and private efforts to improve
testing methods.
132 For instance, mattress fires in prisons and hospitals have drawn significant attention and study from
HEW, state agencies, and the Bureau of Prisons. See Show and Gillette, supra note 102, at 12, col. 1.
133 Show, Fire Went "Wshoosh"-And Two Youths Were Dead, L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, 31, at 13, col. 3.
134 Id.
135 Telephone Interview with Eric Rubin, Staff Attorney, FTC's Washington Regional Office (Dec. 11,
1979). See also Heckman, Legal Exchange, MOD. PAsTics, Feb. 1976, at 108, which included a warning of the
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pressures of the press, government agencies, and successful plaintiffs rendered
unprofitable the continued ignorance of managers regarding the fire hazards
136
presented by their products.
The FTC's consent order was flawed in several respects. First, according
to FTC officials, the committee's $5 million funding base was insufficient to
remedy the industry's ignorance regarding the combustibility of its products.
Second, the order contained no provision explicitly requiring management to
digest and assimilate information generated by the Product Research Committee, and gave the FTC no powers to discern whether indirect assimilation had
taken place. Nevertheless, the consent order set in motion-or at least was a
part of-a series of events which compelled the plastics industry to accept
responsibility for its defective products and thereby provided it with an incentive to disseminate complete and accurate product information and to improve
product quality.
Case 4: Mobile Home Industry
Probably the most far-reaching attempt at managerial restructuring occurred within the mobile home industry. The successful results of that effort
are not only visible but have been acknowledged by the targeted companies.
Their experiences suggest the potential of these remedies.
The FTC began an investigation of the mobile home manufacturing industry in August 1972, focusing on warranty performance and warranty service systems.' 3 7 The Commission selected sixteen representative companies for
close scrutiny, t 38 and eventually named the four largest of these companies,
which were also the subjects of a majority of the consumer complaints, as
respondents in consent order proceedings. 39
The FTC's investigation continued until 1974, and revealed the need for
improvements in warranty performance systems and for government intervention to effectuate those changes. Studies revealed that the typical purchasers of
mobile homes were blue-collar workers and retirees, whose income level was
below that of the general population.140 An FTC report described these purchasers as "tend[ing] not to pursue their rights when defects or problems do occur [and] rely[ing] totally on the expertise of both the dealer and the manufac41
turer to handle the sometimes complicated details of the entire transaction."
The complexity of mobile homes aggravated these purchasers' comdangers of exaggerated product claims for creating either a cause of action for negligence or breach of warranty.
136 See Show and Gillette, supra note 102, at 12, col. 2. The most serious problems are presented by these
plastics products purchased several years ago by consumers who continue to be unaware of their deadly

flammability characteristics.
137 FTC REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER ON PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE: MOBILE HOME
SALES AND SERVICE 19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER].

138 Interview with Randolph Tritell, Staff Attorney, FTC's Washington Regional Office, in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 28, 1979). He explained that the consent order proceeding was used to obtain
prompt results for a large number of consumers while the lengthy rulemaking procedure continued.
139 1977 Subpoena Returns, Mobile Home TRR Proceeding, R8 22188-4235 [hereinafter cited as 1977
Subpoena Returns]. The proposed trade regulation rule was in turn modeled after the consent order provisions. The experiences of the four respondent companies under the consent order were of special interest to
participants in the later proceedings.
140 REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 137, at 29-34.
141 Id. at 33.
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parative lack of sophistication. Mobile homes consist of a package of products
and services, 1 4 2 all susceptible to defects which may impair the safety and
habitability of the home. 143 Because the mobile home distribution chain is complex and the distances between manufacturer, dealer and consumer are often
great, defects often are not detected before the final anchoring of the home.
When defects appear, purchasers turn to the dealer for the promised warranty
service. However, dealers may be unable or unwilling to answer those complaints. Manufacturers select dealers primarily because of their ability to sell,
secondarily because of their credit history, and only incidentally because of
their ability to perform warranty services and home anchorings. 144 Even if
capable of repairing defects, dealers may be reluctant to do so because of the
14 5
difficulty of securing reimbursement from manufacturers.
The mobile home industry itself also contributed to the problems in warranty performance. Rapid industry expansion in the late 1960's and early
1970's resulted in the creation of a number of large firms with perilously decentralized and informal management systems. 146 Communication in these firms
between plant and management officials, and between dealer and manufacturer, regarding product defects and customer service requests was
inadequate. 147
The FTC's investigation revealed that the mobile home manufacturers
breached their warranty obligations. In some areas of the country, up to forty
percent of all purchasers were unable to obtain warranty service. 148 The ambiguity, informality or nonexistence of systems for handling service requests
resulted in an unacceptable juggling of service responsibilities between dealers
and manufacturers. 149 The reluctance of these parties to accept responsibility
for defects resulted in repairs being greatly delayed, which in turn resulted in
cus t omers undertaking the repairs themselves or living with the
150
inconvenience.
In March 1975, the FTC accepted four consent orders which attempt to
redress this situation.15 1 The orders require the respondent companies to create
142 Id. at 103 n. 52.
143 Safety features of mobile homes are covered by the National Mobile Home Construction and Safety
Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5 5401-26 (1976 & Supp. 111978). These standards only attempt to deal
with defects which render a home uninhabitable and therefore do not address warranty performance
systems. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 137, at 228.
144 REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 137, at 65 (quoting Lee Posey, President of Redman

Industries, testifying before the TRR proceeding on March 29, 1973).
145 "Too often in the past the manufacturer/dealer relationship has been an adversary relationship. We
feel this must change: the relationship must become more of a partnership." ManufacturedHousing Dealer56,
60 (Nov., 1978) (quoting Fleetwood President William Weide in an interview).
146 According to Eric Rubin, the extent of the manufacturers' ignorance of their own operation in the
early 1970's was incredible. Several companies even had inadequate records of the extent of their assets.
Telephone Interview with Rubin, supra note 135. Pam Stewart reiterated this view and described the FTC
investigation as offering the respondents the benefits of a very expensive management consulting evaluation
at the public's expense. Telephone Interview with Pam Stewart, Staff Attorney, FTC's Washington
Regional Office (Jan. 18, 1980).
147 REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 137, at 171-72.
148 Mobile Homes Sales and Services Trade Regulation Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,330 (1979).
149 REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 137, at 73.
150 Id. at 185.
151 In re Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 309 (1975); In re Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C.
414 (1975); In re Skyline Corp., 85 F.T.C. 444 (1975); In Re Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. 472 (1975).
Commodore Corporation, one of the four consent order companies, suffered severe financial setbacks
just prior to the Commission's acceptance, by which time it had dropped from an operation of 23 plants to
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channels for the communication of service requests from purchasers to dealers
to manufacturers, and to establish a "uniform procedure for the systematic
receipt and analysis and fair disposition of all complaints.' 1 5 2 Each firm's
customer service manager is required to review periodically both service
records and the results of questionnaires sent by the firm to mobile home purchasers.' 53 The customer service manager must send summaries of that infor154
mation each month to responsible corporate officers.
The consent orders also create certain service responsibilities and clarify
the service obligations of both dealer and manufacturer. The order requires the
55
manufacturer to inspect the mobile home both before and after occupancy.
Each manufacturer must also review regularly its dealers' qualifications to perform home anchorings and warranty repairs, 5 6 and assign responsibility for
repairs in detailed, written agreements with the dealers.15 7 Responsibility for
the entire warranty service program is centralized in a corporate level
official.' 5 8 The consent orders are also intended to serve as a model for, and a
reliable indicator of, the potential for success of a.trade regulation rule under
consideration for possible adoption on an industrywide scale.
The contemporaneous rulemaking injects a measure of uncertainty into
any evaluation of the effect of the consent orders. Anxious to avoid further
government regulation, industry officials may be inclined to deny that the pro159
visions are necessary, or that they result in noticeable consumer benefits.
Fueling their skepticism is the mounting rhetoric attacking government regulation in general and the FTC in particular. 60 In addition, according to FTC
files, the four targeted companies have recently become uncooperative with
compliance efforts and are complaining of being subjected to special regulatory
requirements which, they claim, place them at a competitive disadvantage.'16
These factors make it difficult to assess accurately the degree to which the
consent orders have affected the behavior of the targeted companies. Nevertheless, improvements are visible. For example, the consent orders require that
each company's customer service manager synthesize information generated
five. For this reason, the Commission modified that consent order substantially on April 22, 1975. Compliance File for FTC Investigation of Commodore Corp.
152 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 325.
153 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 316; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 420; Skyline
Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 451; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 478.
154 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 316; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 421; Skyline
Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 451; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 479.
155 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 321; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 425-26;
Skyline Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 456; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 484.
156 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 318; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 422; Skyline
Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 452; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 480.
157 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 319; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 424; Skyline
Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 454; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 482.
158 The job description of Skyline's Director of Consumer Services reads: "to establish, maintain and
analyze service records so as to provide reports and recommendations to management as to how to maximize cost effectiveness and how consumer satisfaction may be achieved in the company's service activities,
to maximize both short- and long-term profits." 1977 Subpoena Returns, supra note 139, at R8 22622.
159 If the final TRR is less stringent the consent order companies may petition to modify the orders,
which technically are permanently binding on them, and subject themselves to the less burdensome industry
rule. Interview with Tritell, supra note 138.
160 See, e.g., Kennedy, Delegalizing Society 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 469 (1980); Gellhorn, The Commission's
Deregulatory Philosophy, 48 ANTrrRUST L.J. 541 (1980).

161 In March of 1979, the FTC voted to commence an investigation into the possible noncompliance of
the four companies. FTC public files document the unwillingness of the companies to cooperate with the investigation. Telephone Interview with Stewart, supra note 146.
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by the inspections and questionnaires and present it to the appropriate corporate officials. 62 Soon after the consent orders were signed, corporate officials
began reviewing the information, noting recurrent problems with particular
1 63
plants and suppliers, and investigating possible solutions to those problems.
64
Close surveillance of the problem plants has resulted in a decrease in defects.1
Moreover, several companies appear to have borrowed the idea of having one
figure within the corporate organization, the customer service manager,
165
responsible for warranty performance.
Less clear, however, is the effect of the consent orders' provisions concerning the respective responsibilities of dealers and manufacturers in performing
warranty obligations. The four manufacturers have terminated very few dealer
relationships as a result of inadequate service capability or performance, 166 and
the manufacturers' inquiries into dealer experience, skills and equipment remain superficial.1 67 On the other hand, the decline in the number of consumer
lawsuits and complaints to the FTC may indicate that these provisions have
168
improved warranty service.
The clearest sign of the legitimacy of Professor Stone's theories lies in the
target firms' own assessments of the benefits derived from managerial
remedies-assessments made after two years of experience under the consent
order and before the rulemaking proceeding, deregulation and anti-FTC
rhetoric had brought about a polarization of attitudes. One of the respondent
companies reported that it had changed its quality control procedures, construction materials and manufacturing techniques "in order to reduce the
number and cost of repairs necessary to comply" with the order's warranty service requirements. 69 The company stated that "the cost of the[se] changes was
less than the benefit received in the form of savings in repair costs and increased good will. ....
170 Another respondent similarly reported that the cost
of the warranty service program was nominal and that "some" savings
resulted.' 7' The company stated that by bringing problems to light early in the
warranty period, the inspections and questionnaires tended "to reduce the
cumulative costs of warranty service."1 72 It also noted that "early attention
tends to reduce the incidence and duration of homeowner dissatisfaction ...
173
thus aiding long term sales."
The experiences of the four mobile home manufacturers reflect more than
162 Redman Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 324-26, Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. at 429-30;
Skyline Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 460-61; Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 487-88.
163 1977 Subpoena Returns, supra note 139, at R8 22137-4235.
164 Id.
165 Telephone Interview with Stewart, supra note 146.
166 Fleetwood and Redman reported dropping no more than five percent of their dealers and Skyline only 26 of its 2206 dealers. 1977 Subpoena Returns, supra note 139, at R8 22137-4235.
167 Manufacturer "evaluation" amounts to dealer self-evaluation of their own service and set-up
capability. See 1977 Subpoena Returns, supra note 139, at R8 22137-4235.
168 Interview with Tritell, supra note 138; Telephone Interview with Stewart, supra note 146.
169 1977 Subpoena Returns, supra note 139, at R8 22137-4235.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 The additional costs incurred as a result of the consent order provisions were of interest in the
rulemaking proceeding and are the most visible consequences of the FTC intervention. Administrative costs
experienced by each individual respondent were included in the responses to the 1977 subpoenas. Those
figures, however, were extended confidential treatment and are not available for public review. Id.
173 Id.
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the applicability of Professor Stone's theories. The current position of the four
companies again demonstrates the importance of the entire context surrounding government intervention and managerial restructuring. The prospect of industrywide regulation of mobile home manufacturers has dampened the receptivity of the targeted companies to the potential benefits of compliance with the
consent order provisions. Instead, the companies have retreated to an adversarial position, certain that no good can come out of administrative intervention.
III. Conclusion
Evaluation of these four sets of consent orders must end with an assessment of the cost of their implementation and maintenance. The costs of the
orders include (1) the FTC's investigative and enforcement costs, (2) the costs
to the respondents of compliance, and (3) the eventual price paid by the public
for the eradication of the misbehavior. Unfortunately, accurate financial data
concerning these costs are neither presently available nor easily compiled. The
Commission's costs are certainly high, given the lengthy investigations
preceding three of the four sets of orders. The costs to the corporations elude
approximation. The only figures available concerning costs borne by consumers involve the mobile home consent orders. A complete and impartial
study of these costs was produced by the United States Regulatory Council,
which concluded that compliance had added approximately fifty dollars to the
cost of the average mobile home. However, the cost to purchasers of waterproofing services or foamed plastic products is probably much less.
Because these orders appear to have produced success at relatively insignificant costs, they constitute attractive regulatory tools which can be used
by other federal or state agencies. Nothing in the above examination suggests
that these positive results are limited to FTC implementation or consent order
application. Nor does the size of company or type of industry appear to be a
factor affecting success. Perhaps the most important variables are extraneous
to the order actually entered-for example, the timing delays experienced in
the Bede Aircraft case, the contemporaneous industrywide rulemaking in the
mobile home case, the change in corporate attitudes among waterproofers, and
the universal criticism of the plastics industry.
It is clear, then, that not all situations are ripe for managerial restructuring attempts, and that surrounding circumstances must be scrutinized before
such attempts are made. The Bede Aircraft and National Meridian cases suggest that managerial remedies may be inadequate to eradicate pervasive corporate problems and deliberate corporate misconduct. The mobile home cases
suggest that attempts to trigger "spillover" effects may be counterproductive if
the targeted corporations see themselves as victims of regulations not imposed
upon their competitors. Nevertheless, managerial remedies hold forth promise
of becoming effective means of deterring corporate wrongdoing. If their implementation is tempered by an appreciation of their inherent limitations, such
remedies may offer the potential of success in restructuring corporate organizations.

